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CH. 1 INTRODUCTION
The Family Planning Industry in Mali
Mali is a geographically diverse, large puzzle-shaped country in the middle of
West Africa. The arid Sahara is slowly encroaching southward into the Niger River delta
and fertile agricultural zones. Mali’s population is likewise varied with over 40 ethnic
groups and local languages, each with established customs of understanding life and
intragroup relationships. These groups have also developed complex intergroup relational
systems, often based on kinship, profession, and historic political alliances. Islam has
been co-opted into the religious identity of over 90% of the population. However, there
are numerous variations to the practice which often integrate traditional beliefs and rituals
that are specific to distinct localities (Bratton, Coulibaly, & Machado 2002). A common
attribute is continued reverence for a sacred well or tree. These symbols are usually
incorporated into stories of the village’s original settlement.
The Malian government has been challenged in recent decades to accommodate
various group needs through social welfare endeavors. Among them is a rounded family
planning program. Mali is home to one of the longest standing centralized family
planning initiatives in francophone Africa, certainly in West Africa1. In 1972, with the
declared aims of reducing maternal and infant/child mortality, family planning was
officially integrated into the Ministère de la Santé du Mali (Ministry of Health). This was
only possible with the dissolution of laws 3 and 4 of the French Law of 1920. Prior to
such time the sale, manufacture, and promotion of contraceptives was prohibited. The 2
year pilot project that commenced in Bamako was expanded in 1974 to include greater
1

There is some debate as to the degree of official government affiliation with the Association Malienne
pour la Promotion and Protection de la Famille. Reunion may have been the first francophone nation to
implement family planning in 1966. Mali would be the second.
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distribution of services and urban outreach. Until 1990, family planning was limited to
urban contexts. After this time, a national promotion campaign was constructed. Around
this same time the Malian government passed a reform allowing women to seek family
planning services without the consent of their husbands.2 Malian family planning has
undergone several transformations which have continuously served to increase services.
The most crucial of these are the continued partnership restructurings with USAID
(Embassy of the United States 2009). Today, family planning is comprised of
government, non-government organization, and privately sponsored family planning
facilities that offer a variety of services ranging from condom distribution to, although
very rare, sterilization. However, the distinction between public and private providers is
blurred; many NGOs and healthcare facilities receive funds and personnel from
international government donors.
With such a robust infrastructure it is natural to assume that family planning has
seen substantial progress. However, statistics cited by Malian officials, private
organizations, and international groups continuously depict stagnant and often lagging
advancement. Why, despite national and international efforts, is family planning failing?
The question of success, of course, depends in large part on the definition of
success used. If success is a reduction in total fertility and solid trajectory on the path to
“development,” as USAID implies, initiatives have failed. Malian fertility, estimated at
6.48 children per woman in the early 1950s, is currently at 6.46 (United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2011). So too, Mali has
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It is generally accepted in the literature that this law functions more as a political measure to secure
additional funding from foreign donors than to actually increase women’s access to family planning
services.
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not made much progress toward achieving the “Asian Miracle”3 of development; it is still
among the poorest nations with an estimated gross national income in 2008 of $7.1
billion (United Nations Development Program 2010a). In 2010 it was ranked 160 out of
169 countries on the United Nations Human Development Index, indicating very low
human development in areas such as health, education, income, equality, and gender
(United Nations Development Program 2010b).
The Ministère de la Santé du Mali defines success as a reduction in maternal and
infant/child mortality. Using these metrics, we must still conclude that family planning
initiatives have failed or are failing. In the past 20 years and the past 10 years in
particular, infant mortality and under 5 mortality have decreased but remain among the
highest in sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division 2011). Maternal mortality is likewise persisting apace
despite advances in healthcare (ibid.). As of 2008, the maternal mortality ratio was 830
deaths per 100,000 live births (UNICEF 2009). Women have a 6% chance of dying
during childbirth throughout their lifetimes (ibid.). Almost 1 in 5 children will die before
reaching 5 years of age (UNICEF 2009 United Nations, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division 2011). 1 in 10 infants4 will not survive the first year
of life (ibid.).
This is not to say that progress has not been made in Mali. Mali’s population,
following the trend of the greater African continent, has continued to increase in recent
years due in large part to improvements in infrastructure, sanitation, and healthcare. At
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The “Asian Miracle” most often refers to the positive development of East Asian nations after World War
II. The economic success of these nations is often used to justify development projects and structural
adjustment programs.
4
UNICEF defines infant mortality was deaths before the first birthday.
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14.5 million inhabitants, Mali’s population is thought to have multiplied by 150% in the
decade prior to 2009 (Institut Nationale de la Statistique 2009). However, available
resources continue to be stretched thin as the effects of desertification and urbanization
become more pronounced. While the majority of Mali’s population remains rural, the
capital city of Bamako has witnessed an unprecedented urbanization in recent decades.
With an estimated population around 250,000 in the mid-1970s, Bamako is now thought
to have a total population of over 2 million (UN HABITAT 2010).
One of the challenges of measuring family planning “success” is that outcomes
are not distinctly correlated with family planning efforts or strategies; they are contingent
upon multiple phenomena. Understanding these phenomena in terms of a national whole
is difficult as Mali’s diversity of geography, infrastructure, ethnicity, language, and levels
of isolation vary greatly from one locality to the next.
With these diversities are born many of the challenges to family planning in
Mali. However, the question remains, why haven’t family planning services made more
of an impact in the almost 40 years since their establishment? Why is contraceptive use
prevalence still among the lowest in world while unmet need is among the highest? Why
is maternal and infant mortality among the highest? How do we understand and measure
family planning programs and their failures? The aim of this study is to understand why
Malian family planning initiatives have thus far been unsuccessful and offer an
explanation which lies at the very heart of family planning initiative construction.
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Family Planning and Development Discourse
As I will show in this paper, there is an apparent disconnect between the stated
intended outcomes of family planning initiatives (decreased fertility and improved health)
and their actual effects in Mali. I argue that this disconnect is the result of a foreign
knowledge which is incongruent with Malian women’s lived realities. Because Malian
family planning is primarily driven by USAID, ideas about womanhood, children, family,
sexuality, and healthcare do not coincide with the experiences of Malian women. Thus,
the provided family planning services are designed for different, perhaps imaginary,
women in different contexts.
In considering this interplay, I turn to the work of Michel Foucault on discursive
formations. Foucault (1972) explains that discursive practices, how we speak about and
think about something, are not only abstract concepts but have actual effects. The way
that these effects are enacted is through a system which links the discursive formations,
unified statements, to a produced knowledge and power structure. In Malian family
planning, discursive formations originating in the United States’ development apparatus
are reinforced by US political and economic power to produce a knowledge about the
Malian woman which assumes to represent authentic Malian experiences. However, as I
shall argue, this knowledge is based upon a fictitious idea of Malian life.
Family planning’s portrait of a normative model for Malian women’s
reproductive practices is based upon a foreign-conceived knowledge. Because this model
originates in a foreign context, ideas about Malian life may be based on second hand
reports or observed through the western lens of development. The normative model is
important because it is created by family planning discursive formations. As the model is
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formed by knowledge of the centralized family planning initiative, those formations are
translated to the local level as project specifics are designed according to the norm’s
needs. An example of this process is Project Keneya Ciwara in the commune of Kendie.
The project, in many aspects, seems to be designed for women outside of the local Dogon
community. Local norms and the purported norms of development initiatives are
disjunctive.
Part of this incongruity is inevitable. Family planning, under the careful direction
of the development apparatus, is attempting to transform the Malian woman. In order to
alter the fertility of a population, family planning must change the target population’s
contraceptive habits. Because reproduction is a social, not only biological reality, family
planning must change society in order to be effective. Thus, it is not only the healthcare
of a population that must shift, but also the way a population thinks – about the body,
sexuality, community, economics, and the state. There is an attempted re-engineering of
social mechanisms, a transformation of knowledge that overshadows local structures with
those of the import. Development initiatives like family planning are not only importing
and extolling foreign medical and biological technology but also foreign knowledge with
regard to a population’s relationship to a series of social, political, and biological
phenomena. Centralized discursive formations are packaged, moved, and reconstituted at
the local level as the Malian woman comes to define herself according to family planning
knowledge.
Foucault describes the process by which this transformation occurs as disciplinary
(1977). In order for family planning to successfully change the fertility habits of a
population, family planning knowledge must be adopted by the Malian woman. She must
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discipline herself through the knowledge of family planning. This knowledge is
reinforced and acted out through professionals in the institution who are sanctioned to
pass judgment on and treat the object. In family planning, it is through the provision of
health services that this discursive regime acts upon the Malian woman’s body and
transforms her into an object of the institution. This is a disciplinary process, whereby the
object comes to know herself through a specific structure of knowledge. If family
planning is to be successful in changing the fertility norms of a population, the Malian
woman would understand herself, her community, and her fertility through the lens of the
development apparatus. She would appropriate family planning’s understandings of the
self and society into her existing understandings of reality. (Foucault 1965, 1972, 1977,
1978, 1980)
One of the reasons family planning in Mali is failing because this process is
incomplete. Because foreign and local knowledge are so dissimilar the intended outcomes
of family planning are not realized. Family planning programs are failing as the local
population becomes unable or unwilling to navigate family planning’s knowledge. In
essence, family planning is encountering resistance from existing formations. Local
Malian knowledge of reproduction is persisting and what we see is an incomplete
discipline of the Malian woman. While Malian women may or may not appropriate
aspects of family planning knowledge, the ways in which they identify themselves and
their realities remain largely untouched. Local knowledge or reproductive life prevails.
Foucault’s understanding of discursive formations helps inform this process.
Ferguson (1994) uses Foucault’s concepts to show how discursive formations and
knowledge help explain the ways in which large development initiatives work. He
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explains how this knowledge of development initiatives is often inaccurate and simplifies
local experience. Studying the development landscape in Lesotho, Ferguson argues that
development schemes often misunderstand local existence and as a consequence fail to
achieve their designs. Though few intended outcomes of development initiatives are ever
realized, the unintended outcomes are almost more influential. The important “side
effects” of failed schemes are expansions of political and bureaucratic power throughout
the state (ibid. p. 252). Ferguson emphasizes that development is rational but not
necessary intentional; the “effects of planned intervention may occur unconsciously”
(ibid. p. 20). Likewise, power in and of itself is not the ultimate ambition of development
practitioners. Ferguson further explains that “if the process through which structural
production takes place can be thought of as a machine, it must be said that the planners’
conceptions are not the blueprint for the machine; they are parts of the machine” (ibid. p.
276). Thus, any intentionality attributed to the development initiative can only truly apply
to a small part of it. Many outcomes of these development schemes, intentional or
otherwise, are agentless.
I will use a similar approach to understand the production of knowledge in Mali’s
centralized family planning initiative. As this knowledge does not completely represent
Malian reality, I am interested in the consequences of this incompatibility. I will attempt
to answer three interrelated questions: why is family planning failing? How is family
planning attempting to change the social structure of the target population? And what are
the unforeseen consequences of this failure to enact social change? Following sections on
existing literature and methods, this analysis will first discuss local Malian experiences of
reproduction. I will then situate family planning within the development apparatus where
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I will examine it for the discursive construction of knowledge related to family planning
itself and normative models intended to represent Malian women. I will then discuss
some of the consequences of family planning’s imposition of incompatible knowledge
beyond the obvious failure of initiatives.
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CH. 2 THE CURRENT LITERATURE
Since this study is concerned with family planning’s discursive production of
knowledge, it is important to understand how current analyses of family planning are
undertaken. This literature on family planning is not distinct from centralized family
planning discourse. It is instead a reflection of that discourse. As the development
apparatus extends its produced knowledge, it also creates a specific way to speak about
family planning. Sanctioned methods of inquiry are often reflected in USAID reports, the
documents of private institutions, and the work of scholars. The lines between these three
groups of actors are often opaque. Many scholars are employed or funded by public or
private development institutions. As later sections more fully explore family planning
knowledge, the similarities between trends in literature and those of centralized family
planning will become more evident. They are all influenced by aspects of the same
disciplinary matrix. However, before approaching the produced knowledge of family
planning I feel it is helpful to first examine the field of current research. I will therefore
discuss two avenues of family planning research, initiative evaluation and outcome
analysis. The goal here is not to necessarily refute past and present efforts to codify
family planning according to certain ideological or methodological formulae, it is rather
intended to illustrate the way family planning is thought about and knowledge is
produced.
While scholarly research in Mali is relatively sparse compared with many of its
East African counterparts, there is a body of work devoted to family planning. This is
likely a result of Mali’s longstanding family planning initiative. This research is
principally quantitative in nature; qualitative analyses are more infrequent and the

10

consideration of family planning is often subsidiary to the prevailing thesis. Studies of
Mali’s family planning programs tend to fall broadly into two sectors of inquiry: those
evaluating family planning initiatives, usually of a centralized governing body to promote
and develop a family planning initiative; and those examining initiative outcome.
Outcome analyses fall into one or several of three categories: acceptance prevalence,
methods to increase service and knowledge distribution, and factors behind reluctant
acceptance/use of family planning techniques. I will follow an overview of these types of
research with a discussion of trends and the similarities with overall family planning
discourse.

Family Planning Program Evaluation
Family planning program evaluations, often described as “effort analyses,” are
broad measures of a family planning initiative. They are intended to be indicative of a
central body’s dedication to family planning. Popularized by Lapham and Mauldin in
1972, they assume that the presence of a family planning initiative or a fertility decline is
not an adequate gauge of family planning success. A comprehensive theory of fertility
remains ambiguous and attempts are often caught up in disciplinary debates, such as
those between demography and anthropology (Greenhalgh 1995). Instead, initiatives are
rated on several factors, including government support and funding. Lapham and
Mauldin’s examinations of family planning efforts (1972 to 2004) is the sole data tracing
family planning changes throughout this time period (Ross, Stover, & Adelaja 2007).
This method of assessment is very influential and has prompted various branches of
family planning evaluation measurements. For example, Lapham and Simmons (1987)
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identified five influences of contraceptive use that determined the effectiveness of family
planning initiatives. These include: measurements of environment, demand for fertility
control, population policies and programs, quality of transactions between providers and
clients, and complementary determinants of fertility.
In family planning evaluation studies, family planning success is contingent upon
several factors which include the type of initiative implemented, the size of the initiative,
and the services offered. The number of factors analyzed is yet to reach a consensus,
though newly introduced components tend to be sub-divisions of Lapham and Mauldin’s
original four; policies/resources/stage setting activities, services and related activities,
record keeping and evaluation, and availability and accessibility of resources (1984).
These four were originally derived from answers to a 30 item questionnaire distributed in
various countries.
Entwisle (1989) claims that the divisions proposed by Lapham and Mauldin are
too narrow in scope. She argues that such “analysts have treated effort as a
unidimensional construct,” thus prohibiting the full exploration of links between
evaluation components and outcomes (ibid. p. 53). She proposes eight components of
family planning effort, subdividing Lapham and Mauldin’s four into subcategories.
Entwisle based her categories on a 29 item questionnaire in 100 counties. Although the
greater specificity offered by Entwisle’s data analysis does propose greater precision, it
does not venture beyond the delimitation of scores. The aim of her analysis, and indeed
others like it is to rate the family planning efforts of a state, not to explain the phenomena
behind those ratings and how they correspond to outcomes.
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In recent years, family planning program evaluations have been expanded to
include new trends potentially influencing overall demographics and the allocation of
health resources in the global south. Among these trends is the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Ross, Stover, and Adelaja (2007) undertook their analysis primarily to update effort
analysis techniques. They sought to include the implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Specifically, they sought to examine the effects of any healthcare resource shortages as
funds were drawn away from family planning to HIV/AIDS programs. Once again
expanding upon Lapham and Mauldin’s original examinations, Ross et al considered
family planning program justification, phenomena negatively influencing programs, the
influence of special interest groups, and the overall quality of family planning services.
Their results were derived from a 125 item survey in nearly 100 countries. Unexpectedly,
a material change in program effort was not indicated by the data in light of recent
HIV/AIDS developments. Francophone Africa continued to be rated the lowest in overall
quality of seven global regions throughout time, not exhibiting any significant drop in
score as HIV/AIDS concerns became more prominent. Specific country data was not
made available in the study.
Such evaluations of family planning structures, while useful in illustrating greater
trends throughout time, are limited in their abilities to explain those same trends. Though
past studies have called for a better “opportunity to explore the internal workings of
family planning programs and to trace the ways in which program inputs translate into
program outcomes,” I am yet to find an effort analysis which successfully bridges this
gap between quantitative components of effort and a qualitative explanation of those
effects (Entwisle 1989 p. 53).
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Family Planning Outcome
The second approach to analyzing family planning initiatives is an examination of
their outcomes. This is usually an analysis of program success, as measured by
contraceptive use prevalence and unmet need, an examination of factors or innovations
potentially influencing outcome, and, occasionally, an explanation of a population’s
reluctant adoption of family planning techniques.
Several studies have conducted not only extensive surveys of acceptance rates but
also offered conjectures as to why those rates are static. Van de Walle and Maiga (1991)
make an important connection in their work between the availability and knowledge of
resources and women’s attitudes toward marriage and children. In a series of in-depth
interviews with 78 Bamako women who had recently given birth, the researchers found
that although women had knowledge of birth control techniques there was little evidence
of past use or the intent of future use. They related this back to local understandings of
the purpose of marriage and children. Many of the women interviewed linked successful
marriage with the number of children born of the union and thus thought contraceptive
use was incompatible with their goals. The researchers also identified a strong correlation
between contraceptive use, spousal approval, and exposure to family planning media
messages. These findings have also been elucidated in the work of Kane, Gueye, Speizer,
Pacque-Margolis, and Baron (1998), Blanc (2001), and Castle (2003) as well as
mentioned in various ethnographic accounts (Holloway 2007, Brand 2001).
Sauvain-Dugerdil, Gakou, Berthe, Dieng, Ritschard, and Lerch (2008) also
conducted an extensive survey in an attempt to link different demographic variables with
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contraceptive use. In a questionnaire of 2000 urban and rural Malians, the study found
evidence to indicate the emergence of changing sexual behavior in youth. Although the
researchers imply that a shift in women’s sexual behavior could be due to increased
female education, they do not provide any evidence beyond the suggestion. Ultimately,
the study links the changes in both male and female sexual behavior to “unfavorable
conditions surrounding the arrival of their first child” (ibid. p.263). These “unfavorable
conditions” are primarily economic hardships which lead to a longer interval between
first sex and first child. Contrarily, Sauvain-Dugerdil et al also witnessed an increase in
“risky sexual behavior” as indicated by earlier sex outside of marriage (ibid.).
These studies highlight the importance of shifting norms and prevailing local
ideologies when explaining the acceptance rates of family planning services. However,
they do not explicitly link these changing attitudes with family planning programs. They
do not include an explanation of the mechanisms that contribute to knowledge shifts nor
do they address how these shifts are executed. Analyses are instead undertaken in a linear
temporality. They assume that the target population will shift when a family planning
program is implemented. Family planning programs’ complicity in changing knowledge
and normative structures is not disclosed and family planning programs’ fundamental
assumptions are beyond the scope of research.
Still, other Mali-specific family planning studies have paid particular attention to
access and knowledge dissemination. Stanback, Dieng, de Morales, Cummings, and
Traore (2005) concentrate on innovations designed to improve family planning programs
by increasing a population’s access to services. They increased access to birth control
technology after the implementation of a clinic-administered checklist. The checklist is
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intended to ascertain the likelihood of pregnancy in clinic patients and thus increase the
number of women eligible for birth control resources. The researchers conclude that the
implementation of pregnancy checklists was an inexpensive and effective method to
increase women’s access to family planning; however, Mali illustrated a high
dissemination rate of birth control to those who sought services. The implementation of
the checklist was materially insignificant. Despite the outcome of this particular
innovation in family planning, this study is illustrative of a trend in the greater literature,
particularly those projects undertaken at the behest of private institutions. Similar studies
by Debpurr, Phillips, Jackson, Nazzer, Ngom, and Binka (2002) and Katz, West,
Doumbia, and Kane (1998) also examine the impacts of different knowledge and service
dissemination techniques on acceptance prevalence and overall knowledge of
contraceptive methods.
A study by Kane, Gueye, Speizer, Pacque-Margolis, and Baron (1998)
foregrounds more recent developments in family planning initiatives. Examining the
effects of a family planning media campaign in Bamako, the study found that
“knowledge and use and more favorable attitudes toward family planning [were]
positively associated with the intensity of exposure to the project interventions” (p. 309).
Media information campaigns are a popular tool used by family planning initiatives to
raise awareness about available services, educate a population on a specific issue, and
slowly change reproductive norms (Brown, Waszak, & Childers 1989). Currently, Mali’s
centralized family planning initiative sponsors many advertisements aimed to create a
unification of government policy and religious beliefs. They are also used to incorporate
men into reproductive health campaigns. Multi-media tools like television series and
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songs by popular artists have also been widely distributed to garner support for services
and foster positive attitudes toward family planning.
A general criticism of studies examining ways to increase services is that they
assume a correlation between available resources and use. A case can also be made that
women accepted for services at clinics are not representative of the population with an
unmet need. These women are the minority who have the ability and will to pursue such
services. Thus, statistically, such studies do not indicate acceptance or success of the
larger initiative, but merely state the availability of resources to a certain portion of the
target population. A larger analysis of the family planning structure itself is beyond the
scope of the research. Ultimately, while these studies are important to ensure that
resources are available to those seeking them, they fail to move beyond an initial
quantitative assessment and make a claim about the effectiveness of family planning
programs. The initiatives themselves escape critical examination of the structure and
appropriateness of their methods.
Several studies on Malian family planning have, however, taken a more critical
approach, linking more complex cultural factors with the success of family planning
initiatives. Castle (2003) and Kaggwa, Diop, and Storey (2008) examine social, religious,
and cultural phenomena that explain women’s reluctance to use contraception. Castle
(2003) found that women’s precarious economic situations – dependent upon male
earnings – greatly influenced their choice not to seek family planning services. A woman
in a polygamous marriage can be made socially and financially vulnerable if she is
thought to be infertile. Moreover, Kaggwa et al (2008) found a significant correlation
between community normative factors and women’s attitudes about fertility. They claim
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that since the female community is collective, fertility is also a communal debate, not an
individual choice.
These studies rationalize resistance to family planning techniques. The focus on
women’s lived realities, while limited in scope, is imperative to understanding the true
outcomes, intended and unintended, of family planning initiatives. These studies provide
the ethnographic data necessary to re-examine family planning structures and the services
provided in distinct communities. However, other than highlighting the threedimensionality of women’s experience in Mali, they do not completely connect their
findings with the current structures of family planning initiatives.

Discussion of Current Literature
It is clear from the existing literature that analyses of Malian family planning are
split on their subjects of interest. On the one hand, analyses focus on the target
population. Studies examining reluctant contraceptive acceptance and those examining
family planning use rates are overtly concerned with the population. For these studies, the
family planning initiative is an assumed constant while the reaction of the population is
the variable. Another way to look at this is in terms of actor and object. The family
planning initiative is the actor whose force is exerted upon an object population. The
effects of this relationship are of interest.
On the other hand, the interests of some studies are reversed. Evaluations of
family planning initiatives and studies of innovations to improve programs are interested
in the family planning initiative. The family planning program becomes the principle of
study, the success of which is the ultimate ambition. The concern is with understanding
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how the program is behaving and how changes to the program affect the whole. The
success of the program is measured by its ability to affect the behavior of the population.
There is, therefore, an implied causality and directionality in these analyses. They
generally lack a holistic approach to the family planning situation. This trend is in line
with that of the centralized family planning initiative, particularly those traits stemming
from modernization principles. Moreover, many analyses tend to rely on a simplified
version the diffusion of innovations theory.
First published in 1962, Rogers’s “Diffusion of Innovations” has been extremely
influential. It has been incorporated into several health belief models. Rogers defines
diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain
channels over time among the members of a social system” (ibid. p. 5). Diffusion, he
continues, “is a kind of social change, defined as the process by which alteration occurs
in the structure and function of a social system” (ibid. p. 6). According to this postulate,
the diffusion of an innovation follows an s-shaped curve reflecting an initial slow
adoption of the innovation followed by an acceleration of acceptance before leveling off
after saturation is complete.
Many family planning studies, either intentionally or unintentionally, rely on this
adoption trend, speculating that failures in the Malian family planning structure are
because the amount of time passed is insufficient for the innovation of family planning to
have diffused to a significant portion of the population. These same studies, while relying
on the diffusion of innovations theory, do not adequately engage with diffusion theory’s
nuances. Rogers points out that the rate of diffusion and successful adoption of an
innovation is dependent upon the social system. As Orlandi, Landers, Weston, and Haley
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(1990) clarify, diffusion of innovations theory assumes that “diffusion patterns and
adoption rates of particular innovations are determined primarily by the scientific
attributes of the innovation and the unique characteristics of the adopted” (p. 290). This
bias of many analyses is inherently detrimental to critically examining family planning
structures as it assumes that with time and the dissemination of information (harkening to
the banking concept of education5) Mali’s family planning initiatives will become more
effective.
The theory of diffusion is problematic.
First, the characterization of the innovation as an intact package directs
attention toward the user system and the adoption decision and away from
the concept of innovation refinement as a means of improving the ‘fit’
between innovation and user. Second, this orientation does not provide an
adequate means of evaluating the potential contribution of efforts on the
part of the resource system or the user system to influence the diffusion
dynamic. In this sense, as a rule, the process is viewed as static rather than
dynamic. Third, the classical model fails to recognize the fact that the
adoption decision is only one step in a multi-step process that ranges from
the first phases of innovation development to a point beyond adoption at
which the innovation either succeeds or fails in achieving a lasting and
meaningful impact” (Orlandi et al 1990 p.291).
Yet, despite these grievances, the theory continues to permeate health development
discourse (Greenhalgh 1995). Though many studies do not overtly ascribe to the
diffusion of innovations approach, there remains an assumed and unexplored stagnancy
surrounding family planning analyses. The true detriment of this approach is its antirevisionist stance. Analyses that rely on diffusion theory ultimately limit the applicability
of their own findings. This is because diffusion theory does not allow reflexivity in
planning institutions.

5

The banking concept of education, as explained by Freire (1993), refers to the student-teacher relationship
wherein the student’s participation in her own education goes only so far as to store knowledge (deposits)
bestowed upon her by the teacher.
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While these issues are important, they do not wholly refute the efforts of past
family planning analyses; they instead point to the directionality of research. This
directionality simply makes them obsolete for the revision of family planning structures
and services. The conclusion to be drawn is that existing knowledge of both family
planning structures and target populations are not separate from family planning
structures themselves. Discursively, they are interdependent. The ways in which family
planning is discussed is engendered to the overall discourse of the family planning
structures they study.
My approach, while recognizing these discourses, is not wholly apart from them.
This analysis will build upon existing studies of family planning evaluation and outcome
measurements by triangulating family planning in a three-dimensional space. The goal is
to link the conceptualization of norms with their actual deployment and effects. The
effects of interest are the unintended consequences of family planning’s produced
knowledge. While previous studies examine only the tangible initiative actions, this
analysis will consider the discursive formations which structure initiatives based upon a
preconceived knowledge of Malian women. In addition, I will attempt to move beyond
the diffusion of innovations theory. To use a term borrowed from Orlandi et al (1990), I
will examine the “fit” between Mali’s centralized family planning initiative and the target
population.
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CH. 3 METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
The Discursive Approach
This study utilizes the theories of Michel Foucault. In particular, I will rely on
ideas about the importance of discursive formations as a way through which knowledge
about family planning is produced. The examination of discursive formations is a point of
departure from previous studies whose foci have been concrete programs and quantifiable
trends. This trend in literature reflects the greater knowledge about how family planning
is to be discussed and understood.
At question here are not the demographic shifts of the Malian population. Rather,
I will analyze the “culture” of the centralized family planning structure and its
implications for the success of family planning outcomes. Another way to view this study
is through the lens of anthropology, wherein an ethnography of the initiative is
undertaken and its narratives are examined for knowledge of Malian women’s
reproductive realities.
As an anthropology of the family planning initiative, analyzing the discursive
formations is both a method and a methodology. Methodologically, discursive formations
produce knowledge that structures institutions. These institutions and their professionals,
in turn, allow the knowledge to affect an object population (Foucault 1972, 1978). They
also constitute specific domains of knowledge, etiquette, and power which affect
outcomes.
Discursive formations are the method by which centralized initiatives disseminate
ideas about family planning. These formations affect the target population in both direct
and indirect ways. The most direct method is through the health clinics and family
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planning outreach services. As a structure of power reconstituted in program outreach,
family planning services privilege certain members of a population. In Mali, the
privileged members of the population tend to be those who can navigate the foreign
knowledge of family planning. Malian women may be prohibited from obtaining health
services because they cannot navigate the family planning system. However, Malian
women who cannot navigate these structures are still impacted by family planning
knowledge. Family planning knowledge is also disseminated through information
campaigns engendered with these centralized discursive formations. Billboards, radio
programs, television programs, and songs by popular artists are all methods through
which the foreign formations are transmitted. The ultimate saturation level of these
ideologies and structures varies; direct transmission leads to incomplete co-optation of
knowledge, behavior, resources, and ideals. These formations are further diffused through
the community and absorbed, renegotiated, and refuted along the way. Thus, Malian
women who do not directly interact with family planning professionals are still likely to
be exposed to aspects of family planning knowledge.
Approaching initiatives from an anthropological standpoint has been completed in
studies of healthcare (Cherrington and Breheny 2005) and development (Ferguson 1994),
however, it has rarely, to the best of my knowledge, been conducted at the institutional
level of family planning. Newland (2001) is an exception. She approaches the study of
family planning in West Java from a related perspective and draws many interesting
conclusions about the attempts of a family planning structure to shape women’s realities.
Relying on Foucauldian ideas of biopower and normative models, she concludes that the
Indonesian family planning initiative, to achieve its goals, links women’s health to the
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health of the state economy. Newland observes that this is successful by creating a new
normative model, the modern woman. This is primarily done discursively through a series
of public campaigns. Newland’s analysis is helpful because it articulates the power of
discourse to reconstitute populations. However, it is also of limited applicability for this
study. Newland’s West Java analysis is largely centered on a domestic program of family
planning. When approaching Malian family planning, one must also contend with the fact
that centralized discursive formations are predominantly of foreign origin. The likelihood
that they adequately reflect local values to the degree necessary to accommodate a shift in
the way a populations identifies is doubtful.
Far from advocating a normative approach to family planning, the dangers of
which have been explored fully (Launay 1995), this analysis illustrates the hazard of the
normative mindset. I argue that family planning programs struggle to ignite effective
change in demographic trends because the knowledge employed to shape the normative
model is inappropriate.

Text Selection
I will survey existing ethnographic literature to illustrate the variability of
authentic reproductive realities in Mali. I will briefly explore women’s experiences of
womanhood, marriage, children, birth, death, and health. I obtained much of this
information from several secondary sources whose foci are not family planning but other
aspects of Malian women’s lives.
There is no singular discourse of Malian family planning. Centralized discourse is
not necessarily stagnant. Rather than provable fact, discursive structures are dominant
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narratives which mirror the shifting social, political, and economic environments in
which they are made. I chose these texts for analysis because they are authoritative and
instrumental in formulating Mali’s centralized family planning initiative. Though there
are arguably many actors in the family planning structure I have identified two which are
of primary importance for this examination, the Malian government and USAID. I will
focus on the USAID portion of the initiative in order to highlight the globalizing
character of family planning discursive formations.
Centralized family planning is composed of strategists and politicians employed
through the Reproductive Health Division of the Ministère de la Santé. It is comprised of
government, non-government organization, and privately sponsored family planning
facilities. Despite the statements of Malian health officials there is a question of the
government’s autonomy over family planning programming; over 85% of family
planning funding is from foreign donors. The largest of these donors are UNFPA, UNDP,
UNICEF, WHO, and USAID (Brand 2001). Since the mid-1980s USAID has been the
largest contributor by several multiples (ibid.). In the five years prior to 2009, USAID
directly invested almost $70 million in Malian family planning (Embassy of the United
States 2009). In addition, USAID and its affiliates design, import, and oversee an
overwhelming majority of family planning programs (Brand 2001).
Centralized family planning is officially under the direction of the Ministère de la
Santé. Government services account for over 52% of all family planning distribution6
(USAID 2009b). In 2006 centralized family planning was composed of 858 community
health centers, 59 referral health centers, and 9 public hospitals (ibid.). In 2005 there were

6

Distribution is defined in terms of tangible provision of goods (pills, injectables,) and not education or
peri-natal services.
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642 private providers operating in Mali, the majority in Bamako (ibid.). The most
prominent NGOs are the Association Malienne pour la Promotion et la Protection de la
Famille (AMPPF), PSI Mali, Family Health International, Marie Stopes International,
JIGI, SPS, the Group Pivot, Population Health, and ASDAP (ibid.). Evidence has been
found that 8 of these 9 NGOs have relationships with USAID which provides financial
support, advisory services, or other partnership functions (ASDAP 2009, JIGI 2009,
USAID 2005, USAID 2009f, USAID 2011a, USAID 2011b)7. Additionally, USAID’s
Project Keneya Ciwara is responsible for 30% of total population outreach in 8 of Mali’s
9 regions (USAID 2009b).
Sources for the documents analyzed include government publications, the
internet, and academic libraries and journals. All documents used for analysis are readily
available to the inquiring general public. Many are used as propaganda and marketing
tools. Malian government policies, declarations, and reports and USAID reports,
marketing materials, and presentations will be used to construct a dominant discourse of
centralized family planning. In particular, I will analyze these documents to identify the
production of family planning knowledge. Of interest are the ways these formations
impact a normative conceptualization of Malian women and the consequences for
program implementation when this norm contrasts with local realities.

7

External confirmation of the 9th NGO (Population Health) could not be located beyond the initial mention
in the USAID report. Thus, it is unknown whether USAID partnered with them in the past.
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CH. 4 MAKING MALIAN WOMEN
What is life like for Malian women? What are their experiences? Mali is home to
over 40 ethnic groups which are spread across a large and geographically diverse terrain.
Capturing one collective Malian voice is impossible. However, in this section I will
attempt to provide a broad overview of local ideas and realities surrounding reproduction.
Relying on data from several studies throughout Mali and neighboring West African
countries, I will briefly discuss some prominent themes of Malian life. My challenge here
is to discuss the common-sense and often tacit meanings that inform reproductive
decision-making.
I begin with a difficulty in understanding Malian women’s knowledge of
themselves. How are gender, womanhood, and male-female interaction understood?
There is a fundamental difficulty for westerners to understand African identity. Western
feminism has historically focused on campaigns of individuality and until relatively
recent works on gender, a biological determinism permeated discussions of women’s
circumstance both at home and abroad. In the West, an individual exists as a whole
system and interacts with society. For many African communities, this concept of
individuality is inappropriate. Brand (2001) explains that in the Mande area8, social
“relations exist prior to the person: it is only by means of social ties that one can achieve
personhood” (p. 16). Concepts of what Brand terms “personhood” are thus, socially
derived. The result, however, is not a complete, autonomous person; it is a member of the
community. Each step along the path to personhood serves to enrich the ties of the person
to the community, thereby strengthening the person and the group. For men and women
8

Tribes of Mande origin have been historically spread across West Africa. The majority of Mali’s ethnic
groups are of this region and many share similar heritage and languages.
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this path to personhood is achieved through rights of passage. These rights can generally
be categorized as circumcision, marriage, and reproduction. In addition, the person must
display appropriate behavior in order to participate in the group. For the Mande, “a life is
fulfilled when it ends in old age and the person is surrounded by children and
grandchildren” (ibid. p. 17). For women, these stages – circumcision, marriage, and birth
– are all centered around concepts of making Malian women, women. Further, these
women appropriate the social fabric of life and transfer it to the next generation through
continued cycles of circumcision, marriage, and reproduction with their offspring.
Female circumcision is a reality for many African women. It often serves to
define their gender and occasionally creates female-to-female bonds between young girls
receiving the procedure together (Holloway p. 113). Circumcision is often regulated by
elder women in the community who possess the knowledge and authority to perform the
ritual. The type of circumcision practiced varies throughout groups and ranges from more
minor procedures like clitoridectomy to the more severe procedures of infibulation.
Cultural and religious rationales are numerous. In Magnambougou outside of Bamako,
many women report that clitoridectomy is performed simply because “it’s our tradition.
We all do this” (Dettwyler 1994). More common understandings, however, justify the
practice as an essential step in making women, women. The Dogon of northern Mali
believe that children have the potential to be either sex and that it is only through
circumcision that boys become boys and girls become girls. Boddy (1989) made a similar
observation when studying northern Sudanese circumcision. She found that “only after
genital surgery are people eligible to become social persons, to assume the
responsibilities of life as…men and…women” (p. 56). A more direct link to fertility is
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cited by Holloway (2007) while living in the southeastern Malian village of Nampossela.
As an informant told her, “here we say that koloboli9 helps girls become good wives and
bear children” (ibid. p. 114 ital mine). This practice also relies on normative justification
in many settings, whereby women comply with the practice because it is simply what is
done to attract a husband and have a family (Dettwyler 1994).
Fertility and the safekeeping thereof are tremendously important to many Malian
women. Women must compete for social capital in order to secure their futures (Brand
2001). While this is obviously important for single women to attract a husband, it does
not lessen with marriage. Because many Malian groups practice polygamy, women are in
competition with their co-wives. Madhavan (2001), citing several other anthropologists,
reiterates that family networks, like those of co-wives, may function as cohesive or
competitive mechanisms. In later work with the Bamana of Mali, Madhavan, Adams, and
Simon (2003) argue that the social repercussions, particularly those of women’s
networks, are impediments to fertility reduction measures. They argue that “a woman’s
social interactions will influence her capacity to use contraceptives and flout traditional
fertility norms. For example, women whose social interaction is largely confined to the
conjugal household may be unlikely to depart from traditional fertility norms, because
such behavior may incur substantial social risks” (ibid. p. 60). Because of this
competition and social pressure to conform to fertility norms – actual, potential, or
otherwise – women must ensure that their reproductive potential remains high.
Part of safeguarding fertility means regulating women’s biology. Women’s
menstrual regularities and irregularities are often causes of great stress. Marabouts, elder
women in the community, shamans, and western medical practitioners are often
9

Koloboli is the Minianka word for excision.
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consulted to ensure women’s fertility. Slobin (1998) highlights the way menstrual
irregularity is perceived as a disease that requires traditional or allopathic intervention.
One of her informants, a young Dogon woman who was experiencing chronic periods of
amenorrhea10 and menorrhagia11, described the nature of her illness as stemming from
hormonal contraceptives: “Usually, I start mes règles12 on the 14th of the month. This
time [during her illness] it continued through the 14th of the next month and stopped on
the 26th. What I think is – these problems come from birth control pills. I didn’t think I
could do anything to help myself, so it was after days of lying in bed that I went to see
the médecin”13 (ibid. p. 373). Castle (2003) finds that this sentiment is not uncommon
among Malian women. Generally, women are reluctant to use hormonal contraceptives
because of the effects of limiting fertility, sometimes for long periods of time. The social
consequences of infertility, or perceived infertility, are great enough that hormonal
contraceptive use is avoided (ibid.).
The desire for ensured fertility and many children is not only based on economic
and social survival. For many African women, children help define their womanhood.
African feminists such as Nnaemeka (2005) have emphasized the necessity of a pronatalist understanding of African women. Pro-natalist sentiments are rooted in West
African reality. Children are not only intrinsically valuable and integral to definitions of
womanhood, they also help negotiate social and economic value. In the agriculturally
active zones of West Africa, children have been conventionally regarded as surplus labor.
They contribute to the economic vitality of the family from early in life by helping
10

Light or no menstrual bleeding.
Excessively heavy menstrual bleeding, usually prolonged and of such severity that the woman is unable
to assume normal daily activities.
12
In French “mes règles translates as “my regulars.” It refers to regular menstrual cycles.
13
In French “médecin” translates as “doctor.”

11

30

mothers cook, cultivate gardens, and vend certain products. They also participate in
traditionally masculine duties such as tending cash crops (cotton, cocoa, etc.) and are
considered retirement insurance as they grow and support elderly parents. Additionally,
children can help maintain kinship and community relationships through marriage and
labor services.
However, the cultural and social value of children alone does not wholly explain
high fertility rates. Mali has some of the highest infant and child mortality rates in the
world. The average Malian woman has 6.5 children (United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2011). 1 out of every 10 infants die
within the first year and of those surviving children, 1 in 5 will die before reaching the
age of five (UNICEF 2009). These statistics, of course, vary throughout Mali and can
(arguably) be assumed to be higher in more rural areas where access to healthcare and
infrastructure is limited. While studying among the Fulani and Humbebe communities of
rural Mali, Castle (1994) noted that in the community of Douentza, “a woman can expect
to have 7.7 live births by the end of her reproductive years. She can expect to lose about
four of these children, however, to childhood illness” (p. 317).
Child death rates are due to a number of problems, including malnutrition, injury,
malaria, and other vector- or water-born diseases. Often, the effects of disease are
accentuated by malnutrition, and vice versa. For many children and their mothers, the
process of death is slow. Dettwyler (1994) observed many experiences of wasting
children while studying nutritional deficiency throughout Mali.
Daouda took one look at me and started crying. But not the loud, vigorous
wail of a healthy child, accompanied by attempts to get away. Rather, his
cries consisted of barely audible whimpers as he tried, without success, to
turn his head away. At 18 months, Daouda weighed only 12 pounds and
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was so weak he couldn’t hold his head up or move his arms or legs
voluntarily. His head looked huge for his body…His arms and legs were
mere bones covered by wrinkled, papery skin. His buttocks were pathetic.
Really just bags of skin hanging in folds from his spine. I could count
every rib without difficulty. He felt like a bundle of sharp sticks… (ibid. p.
31)
Daouda is not an outlier in Malian life. He represents the lived experience behind child
mortality statistics.
In a self-perpetuating cycle, some child deaths are due to children spaced too
closely together. As women have more children – by desire, necessity, or accident - the
births are often too close together. Not only is there physical trauma for the woman, who
often does not have adequate access to medical facilities and personnel, but existing
children often suffer from nutritional deficiency as they are weaned. Kwashiorkor is a
disease that occurs when a diet is deficient in protein but very high in empty calories.
Breast milk usually contains adequate amounts of protein for even older toddlers.
However, in places where staple foods, like cassava and potato varietals, do not contain
enough protein, children develop Kwashiorkor as breast milk is withheld from them and
an adequate protein substitute is not found. In the rural village of N’tenkoni, Dettwyler
(1994) encountered the following case of funu bana14 and describes its effects as such.
The little girl presented all of [kwashiorkor’s] classic symptoms. Her face
was round and puffy, almost as though she had been beaten. Her hands
and feet appeared plump, like her face. But the defining characteristic was
her enormously swollen abdomen. Bulging against her dress, it strained
the fabric, giving her the incongruous appearance of a pregnant woman.
Her expression was one of sadness and apathy, her eyes sunken and dull.
(ibid. p. 71)
This phenomena is prevalent enough in Mali that the Malian ministry of health actively
promotes birth spacing as part of its family health programs. High fertility is partially
14

“Funu bana” literally means “swelling sickness” and is the local derivation for Kwashiorkor in N’tenkoni
(Dettwyler 1994).
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explained by the uncertainty of children’s survival. Although child mortality statistics are
swayed by a growing urban population with greater access to healthcare, there is likely
great variability throughout the state.
Such is the value of children that women brave the danger of giving birth
frequently, not a task to be taken lightly. Women have a 6% chance of dying during
childbirth during their reproductive lives (UNICEF 2009). This is among the highest
maternal death rates in the world. Poor nutrition, inadequate access to peri-natal care, and
lagging infrastructure are only some of the complications with which pregnant and
birthing women contend. While in the southeastern village of Nampossela, Holloway
(2007) described the following birth experience while working with a local midwife.
Monique [the midwife] and I slowly raised her by the elbow. Unlike other
women, there was nothing meaty about Korotun. Her ribs and backbone
protruded, her skin too thin a canvas stretched over a meager frame.
Monique and I guided her, letting the contractions build, gauging when
they were cresting, and ordering her to push…[The baby’s] head hung
there, streaked with white vernix and crimson blood, between Korotun’s
splattered thighs…There was so much blood…Korotun pushed the
shoulders out and the rest of the being quickly surrendered to the
world…there was so much blood….The right side of her vagina was
shredded as if the birth had been literally ripped from her. Her vagina
looked less like an organ of wonder than a hideous wound…[If the
bleeding didn’t stop], a woman was balanced on the back of a moped, like
a goat condemned for market, and raced to the Koutiala hospital. (ibid. p.
109-10)
The average woman will endure, if she does not die first, 7 such experiences during her
reproductive years.
Although women endure such hardship to give birth in Mali, the uncertainty of
their children’s fate greatly influences social understandings of sickness, death, and grief.
Coping mechanisms are common, many of which allow women to find comfort in
uncontrollable circumstances. They also absolve mothers of guilt surrounding child
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illness and death. Scheper-Hughes’ (1992) seminal work in northeastern Brazil concerns,
among other themes, the apparent indifference with which mothers regard their children.
She claims that these reactions do not necessarily reflect a mother’s apathy toward her
children, but are instead culturally mandated or sanctioned coping mechanisms (ibid.,
Castle 1994). Castle (1994) observes that among the Fulani of rural Mali the concept of
pulaaku, a code of social behavior, “requires acceptance and stoicism in the face of
physical hardship and emotional distress” (p. 314). Brand (2001) observes similar social
regulations of emotion among the Mande near Bamako. “It is a feature of hòrònya
(nobility) to hide one’s emotions” (p. 97). The code of pulaaku, Castle (1994) further
explains,
is also important for understanding maternal reactions to child deaths. In
the Douentza communities, it is commonly believed that at birth God
gives each person a finite number of days on earth and that everyone has a
prearranged day of death. The most common reason given for death was
thus that the child’s ‘time had come’ (saatu mako wari), and public
complaint would have been contrary to the will of Allah and therefore
irreverent. The Fulbe, in particular, believe that the child of a woman who
cries at its death will not be able to testify for her in front of God on the
day of judgment. (ibid. p. 322)
The will of Allah is also a common justification for premature death among the Mande
(Brand 2001) and people of Nampossela in southeastern Mali (Holloway 2007).
This resignation in light of the realities of poverty, insufficient healthcare
services, and lacking sanitary infrastructure is also reflected in common justifications of
child death and disease. Dettwyler (1994) explains a mystical justification incorporated
into childhood disease models she witnessed in rural Mali. In the village of Totokoro,
developmentally disabled or delayed children were understood in the following manner:
And then there are those children who never grow up…They just never
grow. They never reach out for things with their hands, they never sit up
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or walk, they never talk. Some begin to, but then stop. You keep praying
and hoping and looking for medicine for them, but nothing helps…then
you know that they are evil spirits, and you give up…Well, you take them
out into the bush and you just leave them…They turn into snakes and
slither away…You go back the next day, and they aren’t there. Then you
know for sure that they weren’t really children at all, but evil spirits. (p.
86)
Castle (1994) explores similar justifications for child disease in rural Mali. She explores
the diagnosis of heendu (wind) and foondu (bird or owl). Among the Fulani and
Humbebe, both of these mystical diseases are thought to be beyond the help of allopathic
medicine. Castle claims that “the hopeless and fatal nature of foondu and heendu [appear]
to permit individual mothers to maintain their psychological well-being in an
environment where they are likely, on average, to lost half their children to childhood
illnesses. Foondu and Heendu in such circumstances give a significance and validity to
their experiences of child death and defend the role they played in the events leading up
to it” (ibid. p. 331).
As I have briefly explored, local forms of knowledge and codes of conduct cannot
be considered as distinct from their immediate localities and extending histories. Ideas
about family, children, health, and disease cannot be separated from the social
environments from which they stem. While justifications for loss and child illness may
seem backward to the Western reader, they should not be necessarily be considered
wrong. They exist as social, not scientific, truths. They are reflections of hardship and
indicative of the manners in which local knowledge, formed within the Malian context, is
employed.
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CH. 5 A KNOWLEDGE OF FAMILY PLANNING
As the brief review in the previous chapter illustrates, Malian ideas about
reproduction are deeply imbedded in the immediate and historical realities of everyday
life. I would now like to examine the family planning institution for some of its ideas
about itself, reproduction, and life in Mali.
Foucault (1972) relates that knowledge is formed by the regular exercise of
discursive formations (p. 182). For my purposes I understand knowledge to function on
two levels in family planning development. One, the knowledge of development itself is
a larger body of formed knowledge. This is family planning’s knowledge of itself and its
role in the development of the global south. The second aspect of knowledge is a
knowledge which defines the object, or normative model.
I divide knowledge here in order to illustrate the ways in which discursive
formations create knowledge that structures institutions and concepts about Malian
women. Ultimately, these discursive formations create what Foucault (1980) calls “a
‘regime’ of truth” (p.133). This “’truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of
power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which
extend it” (p. 133). Though professionals allow knowledge to act, those professionals
also refine that knowledge and possess the authority and power to affect the objects of
family planning.
The division of knowledge between the institution and the object serves to
illustrate the vastness of the knowledge construct; it encompasses self-definition (family
planning as it understands itself) and other circumscription (definitions of the object). As
I explore the construction and employment of family planning knowledge, these
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distinctions of knowledge will also serve to highlight the process of object transformation
(or discipline) by which the Malian object comes to understand herself according to the
institutional dictates of family planning.
However, despite the usefulness of this exercise, knowledge should not
necessarily be conceptualized as a bound set of stagnant positivities. As Foucault reminds
us, discursive formations which constitute knowledge and institutions are not
“coextensive with it” (1972 p. 179). Knowledge and the elements thereof originate at
various levels of and from various modes of discourse harnessed and employed by an
institution. In fact, the knowledge of Malian women can be thought of as simply how a
larger structure of knowledge is translated and applied to a population. The knowledge is
rearticulated in such a way that it constructs the relationship between the object and the
disciplining institution insofar as the object is defined by that knowledge.

Family Planning as Development
To begin to understand family planning in Mali it is first necessary to understand
what development is and how family planning is subject to its inherent conceptualizations
of space, time, power, society, and itself. This is the institutional knowledge. This raises
questions of what family planning is and how it functions. Family planning assumes that
it is a force to be exerted upon a local population. The origins of this assumption lay in
the institution of development. I will thus take as the first formations of study those that
constitute a broad knowledge of family planning as it is understood to function in the
institution of development and in the global south.
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Family planning in Mali is not state bound nor the recipient of a linear strategic
trajectory. It is best understood as a mixture of local and international interests. The
involvement of USAID, though dominant economically, cannot be simplified as a
western state agenda but should be seen as a locus for competing knowledges resulting
from several levels of public and private bureaucracies. These bureaucracies would
include the central government’s foreign policy, military policy, and also private
corporations such as pharmaceutical and medical equipment manufacturers.
The family planning initiative itself is structured rather hierarchically. It is
occupied with and swayed by political and economic interests. The manners in which
family planning initiatives see themselves, their subjects, and their tasks are constructed
by discursive formations bound by the realities of the institutions. One way to think about
the centralized family planning initiative is as a large campaign. As Brown, Waszak, and
Childers (1989) relate, “the particular political, economic and social structures of the
society in which these campaigns have been conducted have affected all aspects of these
campaigns, including when they were conducted, who sponsored them, to whom they
were directed, what they tried to accomplish and which channels of communication were
(and could be) used” (p. 86). It is thus these roots of family planning that must be
understood as reinforcing constructions of discursive formations.
Family planning development, however, cannot fully reflect the social
experiences of the environment in which it was formed. Nor can it capture the
environment of the target population. To explain this behavior I rely on Scott (1998). In
his book “Seeing Like a State,” Scott details how the state, like other bureaucratic
machines, is hardwired a specific way. Such structures, Scott claims, are programmed to
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visualize and interpret the world in two dimensions. They will observe only those aspects
of social reality that are of official interest. These observations are static, aggregate, and
almost always written as documentary fact. Bureaucratic structures also have a natural
tendency to group citizens in ways that permit them to make collective assessments.
Further, Scott states that these “simplifications, like all state simplifications, are always
far more static and schematic than the actual social phenomena they presume to typify”
(ibid. p. 46).
This is the manner in which a body of accepted knowledge develops. The way
bureaucracies simplify problems is problematic. The inherent nature of these structures to
simplify and reduce social existence to a series of monastic inputs diminishes the
potential success of development projects. Because these institutions are incapable of
multi-factor analysis, projects undertaken do not consider or receive inputs from the
entire strata of social life. It is thus easy to see how family planning initiatives fail to
comprehend women’s experience.
With these considerations in mind, I will now approach centralized family
planning from the standpoint of development interests. What is it that the initiative is
interested in? When asked about the significance of family planning in development,
USAID responds that
Those countries in the developing world that have invested in health and
education and have provided women access to family planning and
reproductive health programs have experienced faster economic growth
than those that have not. When couples can choose the number, timing and
spacing of their children, they are better able to adequately feed and
educate their children, potentially ending the cycle of poverty.
Communities thrive, and in turn, countries fare better. Today the greatest
deficits in access to health services can be found in the poorest segments
of the population. By channeling resources to family planning, nations can
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save lives, stabilize population growth, slow the spread of AIDS, reduce
poverty and improve women’s position in society. (USAID 2009c)
Many of the goals mentioned in this rationale are identical to those of agricultural and
infrastructural development projects. As illustrated by this explanation from USAID,
there are two driving themes of family planning as development, progress and economics.

Evolution, Progress, and Modernity
In considering the idea that family planning is a force to be exerted on the local
population we arrive at the evolutionary mindset of development. This assumption
undergirds family planning execution and informs the larger structure of knowledge. The
development of family planning may be conceived of in two senses; as a process and as
an industry. By industry I refer to the structured enterprise whose business is the process
of development. Of concern is how that industry functions. How does it see itself and the
objects of its attentions? How is the process of family planning development employed?
First, as an industry itself, development and family planning exist in the form of
two ideologies. Although sometimes claimed to be mutually exclusive, these ideologies
are just as often related by justification and procedure. Both notions of development are
problematic in that they employ generalized assumptions often based on simplified and
fictitious notions of modernity. On the one hand, development may be conceived in a
particular linearity, the goal of which is to bring southern states through time and into a
modern world exemplified by western civilization. On the other hand, development is
often altruistically understood as the alleviation poverty and suffering.
These two faces of development also merge as a goal and the means by which it is
achieved and measured. Successful development, that is the achievement of
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modernization, is assumed to coincide with a mitigation of poverty. As expressed by
Ferguson (1994), what we have is a blurring of “these two meanings, implicitly equating
‘modernization’ with the elimination or alleviation of poverty” (p. 15). This is apparent in
USAID’s rationale cited on pages 39 and 40; it is through the developmental scheme of
family planning that a modernized state is achieved.
This evolutionary rationale is deeply imbedded in development and has been coopted by family planning initiatives as they attempt to change the discursive landscape of
target populations (Newland 2001). The imposition of foreign formations should not be
wholly understood as coincidental. Development enterprises are incentivized to guarantee
their own prosperity. They employ tactics long seated in theories of modernization which
create an entire understanding of the global environment.
The rise of modernization theory in the 1950s exemplified a linearity which
considered nations to share a developmental future. Generally, modernity is a “term to
describe particular forms of economy and society based on the experiences of Western
Europe. In economic terms, ‘modernity’ encompasses industrialization, urbanization and
the increased use of technology within all sectors of the economy. This application of
technology and scientific principles is also reflected within social and cultural spheres”
(Willis 2005 p. 2). Development schemes based on such models fail to account for unique
factors that impact development in the target population. They also rely intrinsically on
an idealized trajectory of American (or broadly, western) development. They fail to
recognize the unique influences which impacted domestic development. As Gilman
(2003) claims, “modernization theory, while overtly focused on the plight of the third
world, echoed and amplified unfolding American sentiments about the condition of
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modernity at home” (p. 12). By creating an outward facing theory based on a
romanticized concept of Americanism, theorists were hoping to validate their concept of
domestic modernity and development by making it repeatable abroad.
This tenant of modernization continues in family planning initiatives currently.
There is an evolutionary mindset which sees the western entity as the symbol of progress
and the southern population as backward. The global south is antiquated and situated in
the past. I find this conceptualization problematic for family planning not only because of
its idealized ideas western deployment, but also for its ignorance of other cultures. There
is a seeming cultural erasure and geopolitical and cultural unawareness. Family planning
initiatives tend to conceptualize welfare in a linear and comparative framework which is
incongruent with realities and experiences of actual women.
Ideas of modernity have also had lasting impacts on the theories of demography
and family planning execution beyond the development apparatus. While an
encompassing theory of fertility does not yet exist, traditional demographic transition
theory still dominates the field. Transition theory states that declining fertility is caused
by the process of modernization itself. As with modernization theory (transition theory
essentially is modernization theory), transition theory is born out of an evolutionary idea
based largely on the experience of post industrialization countries in the global north.
While diffusion theory has garnered more supporters in recent decades, there remains a
prominent loyalty to modernisms tenants. As Greenhalgh (1995) explains, “even as they
abandoned the main hypotheses of classical transformation theory, demographers seeking
new approaches managed to retain many of the implicit assumptions that underlay it” (p.
10).
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What I have found interesting when examining documents of USAID is that the
relationship between demographic change and modernization is not as straightforward as
this theoretical understanding would imply. In a presentation by USAID’s Health Policy
Initiative to Mali’s Ministère de la Santé in 2009, modernity and demographics were
explicitly related. However, the relationship was implied to be more reciprocal or
complex than a strict linear correlation. Fertility decline is seen as a necessity for Mali to
become modern. In a classic chicken or the egg situation, modernization is seen as the
desirable product which may lower total fertility once achieved, but total fertility decline
is necessary for modernization to progress. Fertility becomes something that cannot be
allowed to slowly and passively decline as modernization evolves. It must be controlled.
The object population must come to define themselves according to a modernized
knowledge. They must be modern objects if modernization is to continue undeterred.
While the ideas of modernization and evolutionary progression still exist, their
relationships to fertility and population behavior are more complex than contributing
theories of demography imply.
The evolutionary ideology of centralized family planning also facilitates an antirevisionist spirit. As family planning is an exerted force, the intention of which is to
transform the social body of a population, it is the agent of change rather than the object
to be changed. With this basic understanding of innovation and population behavior,
family planning initiatives are not assumed to be responsible for populations’ needs.
They are the provider of services and technologies. It is up to the population to mold
themselves in order to use those services and as a consequence of using those services.
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Economics of Family Planning
Like concepts of modernity, ideas created in the neo-liberal revolution had drastic
impacts on the global development industry. Stemming from this history are a series of
formations which create an economic knowledge of family planning and its duties.
In the 1970s there was a reflexive dialogue within academia and development
organizations re-examining Keynesian approaches to economic success. Returning to
classical economic theorists such as Adam Smith, the neo-liberal revolution, epitomized
by the Reagan (USA) and Thatcher (UK) policies, inspired an era of development
promoting the invisible hand of the market. By the 1980s this idea was well established in
the development community. An era of controversial structural adjustment programs tied
to the IMF and World Bank truly illustrated the “focus on stressing the relationship
between economic growth rates and the degree of state intervention in prices. The
implication was that the most rapid growth rates were found in those countries which
were most outward-oriented and where states were least involved in ‘distorting the
market’” (Willis 2005 p. 48).
For family planning, the implications of this structural shift lay in the
solidification of economics as the method to measure progress. As the environment
becomes one of economy so too do populations become economic actors. I find Marxist
and neo-Marxist criticism helpful in understanding this economic structuring. Of
particular importance for critics of family planning and development today are Marx’s
(1994) observations of the capitalist system as a whole and how the lower class,
“proletariat,” were disadvantaged, positioned as consumers and producers. “According to
Marxist theory, capitalism needs ever increasing opportunities to create profit in order to
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survive. Colonies [and arguably independent nations in the global south] provided
excellent possibilities for further profit generation, through the creation of new markets,
new sources of raw materials, and cheap labour” (Willis 2005 p. 65). Through this
understanding, development is a mechanism to increase the expanse of capitalism
globally, not only to spread its influence but to prevent its demise. The critique is
partially validated in light of devastating structural adjustment programs and World Bank
and IMF lending demands.
Neo-Marxists argue that a Marxist understanding is too western-centric and focus
on multi-national corporations and organizations. Theories posit that “capitalism was
now in a period of ‘monopoly capitalism.’ Large companies dominated the world
economy and were able to exploit poorer parts of the world” (Willis 2005 p. 65).
Development criticism based upon such suppositions often questions not only the visible
actions of development but also the latent agenda. “The bulk of ‘development’ discourse,
with all its professions of concern for the rural poor and so on, is for these writers simply
a misrepresentation of what the ‘development’ apparatus is ‘really’ up to. The World
Bank may talk a lot about helping poor farmers, for instance, but in fact their funds
continue to be targeted at the large highly capitalized farmers, at the expense of the poor”
(Ferguson 1994 p. 18).
When modernity is identified as the ideal end, the healthy state of existence, those
forces inhibiting the full realization of this norm are the disease. Herein lays a point of
contention among family planning initiative documents. While USAID emphasizes the
economic health of the population (USAID 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f),
the Malian government most commonly emphasizes maternal and child health. The
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rationale of the Malian government for implementing a family planning program was to
be “’humane, oriented towards the health of the mother and child, the happiness of the
couple, and the well-being of the entire society’” (Tounkara as cited in van de Walle and
Maiga 1991). USAID does mention maternal and child mortality rates in most
documents, however, they are often secondary to economic interests in the way
population health is linked to healthcare costs and economic burdens.
The Malian government’s rational for its family planning program connects the
health of the individual and the health of the society. Public health is costly (as
emphasized in USAID 2009b) and high fertility rates are seen as detrimental to the health
of a developing modern economy. Aside from the cost of healthcare and sick individuals,
women are outside of the formal economy and thus of detriment. While I believe that the
family planning institution assigns primary importance to economic health I likewise
admit that the health of the population is of concern for both the sake of health itself and
the health of the economy.
Such criticisms question not only the broader global landscape of development
and family planning but also question the focus of family planning, locating it not in the
female experience of its subjects but in the grander global economic scheme. As
modernity becomes defined by economic prosperity, family planning development
initiatives come to understand their purpose as approaching that ideal economy. Thus, the
overarching themes of family planning knowledge are the movement of modernization
and the character of economics.
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Toward a Modern Malian Woman
The ideal of family planning is transformation. Fertility that is currently high
needs to be low. A backward mechanism for living needs to be modernized. That which
is destitute needs to flourish. In order to achieve these ends family planning must
transform the behavior of the target population. Discursively, this is achieved through the
disciplinary process whereby the object is self-defined according to family planning
knowledge. In order for this process to progress there must be an ideal norm (the goal),
an identification of maladies preventing the population from achieving that norm, and a
course of action designed to remedy the identified problem. By understanding how
family planning knowledge constructs the normative model, we come to understand the
second level knowledge at play in Mali’s centralized family planning initiative. This
knowledge informs the construction of the object (Malian women) and also assigns the
object certain normative qualities of behavior and belief.
The ideal object of family planning is understood to have a certain character and
relation to the greater knowledge of the institution itself. The Malian woman is also
understood to be malleable. It is assumed that she will be readily disciplined and come to
define herself according to ideas of the modern Malian woman espoused by family
planning initiatives. To ascertain the qualities of the normative model I once again return
to family planning as a development discourse and ask how it primarily understands
itself. Decreasing fertility and improving health, while certainly aspects of the family
planning initiative, are not ends in and of themselves. They are rather the tools
contributing a greater goal.
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In reviewing the basic tenants of family planning I identified two phenomena
which have historically driven development: modernization and economics. The ideal
object of family planning is the modern woman, however, while modernization may be
the process and ultimate goal of family planning development, economics is the tool by
which that process and end are measured. It is thus the degree to which the Malian object
internalizes modern economic traits that determines the quality and degree of her
modernity.
Working from within modernization theory, family planning sees the Malian
woman as backward. There is a need for progress that is explicit in nearly all USAID
documents. High fertility is placed in direct opposition to the Millennium Development
Goals, the rationale being economic strain (USAID 2009a, 2009e, Embassy of the United
States 2009). It is scarcely possible to find a document that does not discuss a larger
state-oriented economic wellbeing. In a presentation given by USAID to the Malian
Ministère de la Santé, the theme behind bolstering family planning programs was to make
“Mali a prosperous, serviceable, and modern nation” (USAID 2009d). However, it is not
economics for the sake of economics that is being promoted. It is a specific type of
economics that is emphasized. This economic structure must fit within the global
capitalist mechanism and be defined by formal market participation.
Accordingly, family planning discourse formulates the Malian woman as merely
waiting to fulfill her capitalist responsibilities and further modernization. Family
planning programs, though exacted through government regulation and services, use the
often explicit rationale (see the citation from USAID on pages 39 and 40) that family
planning will help free women of forces preventing them from labor in the formal sector.
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This emphasis on formal wage employment is very important. The discourse of family
planning does not accommodate informal market participation. Family planning
programs are intended to allow Malian women to become productive producers and
consumers in the modern economic world. Women are, in this sense, simply latent
commodities, who must be freed from biological, social, and cultural confines in order to
participate in the economic sphere and help urge the state into modernity.
USAID documents overtly emphasize two economic benefits of decreased
fertility (USAID 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f). It is not only the cost of
implementing the programs which is addressed; it is also the cost of doing nothing about
existing total fertility rates. The latter is a concern of public health. Family planning
initiatives, while functioning in a developmental capacity, are also public health
organizations. As such, they rely on several understandings of health and disease to
inform program and policy choices. While overarching health belief models are useful
when understanding the initiative construction process (see Glanz et al, 1990 for a good
review), economics largely drive the construction of programs.
As Malian women are relieved of their motherly burdens and enter the formal
market, their production potential increases state capital reserves. This is reciprocal to the
cost of allowing fertility rates to continue their incline (USAID 2009b, 2009e). By
decreasing fertility and increasing women’s formal economic productivity, there is also
made explicit a decrease in healthcare costs as the number of state dependents drops.
Often, family planning is justified with a cost analysis. The total cost of family planning
services (assumed successful in their endeavors) is contrasted with projected healthcare
expenditures (USAID 2009b, 2009d, 2009e). Through this lens family planning would be
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seen as a social control over the number of children a woman has, thereby lowering the
state’s number of dependents and freeing the woman’s time for practices contributing to
the capitalist market. Social mechanisms are manipulated in order to make individuals
internalize state and market interests. Family planning’s imposition of discursive
formations is the vehicle for the transfer of these market interests in the discipline of
Malian women.

Fertility, the Self, and Science
In order for Malian women to become modern capitalist subjects, there must be a
transformation. The Malian woman must come to understand herself through family
planning knowledge. One of the ways this is achieved is through the implementation of
an entirely new discourse by which to understand fertility and the self. With the
introduction of a scientific lexicon, family planning discourse creates a divide between
the social and the biological halves of Malian women. They are divided into two realms
of discourse in order to focus attentions on the reproductive. This isolation of the body
from the social fabric of reality is accentuated by a distinct discourse through which to
understand it and which gives rise to mechanisms of control. This discourse, Science, is
individualizing, converting reproduction into personal control. Removed from social life,
reproduction becomes the choice of one (or two) people; this is easier to control through
the discourse of Science than an entire social milieu.
Bruno Latour (2004), in his book “The Politics of Nature,” makes a distinction
between the sciences (social sciences) and Science. Science, claims Latour, is “the
politicization of the sciences through epistemology in order to render ordinary political

50

life impotent through the threat of an incontestable nature” (p. 10). What I find helpful
about Latour’s work, though it focuses on environmental ethics, is his emphasis on the
ideological elevation of Science in western cultures. Science has become an all-knowing
deity. In its omniscience, Science defines truth and its tools become the means to validate
experienced phenomena.
With family planning initiatives, the science-based knowledge is transposed onto
the social existence of the target population. Foucault (1972), on speaking of the interplay
between science, knowledge, and ideology, states that “the question of ideology that is
asked of science is not the question of situations or practices that it reflects more or less
consciously; nor is it the question of the possible use or misuse to which it could be put; it
is the question of its existence as a discursive practice and of its functioning among other
practices” (p. 185). We should thus understand Science not as an all powerful truthsaying force, but rather as it functions within the body of family planning knowledge.
Science is “localized in [knowledge], structures certain of its objects, systematizes certain
of its enunciations, formalizes certain of its concepts and strategies” (ibid. p. 185).
Science becomes the language through which legitimate reproductive experiences are
understood.
It is through this lens that the social existence of the population must be filtered in
order to be understood. This is true of the family planning structure itself, which
understands fertility through the scientific vernacular. It is also desired of the Malian
woman. For, as she comes to understand her fertility through Science’s “objective” lens,
the social ties to fertility are theoretically severed.
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As primary evidence for this process I take the overwhelming reliance of family
planning programs on quantitative data. In and of itself, quantitative data reveals trends.
Family planning programs rely on all manners of quantifiable statistics to understand a
population. It allows generalizations to be made. It rationalizes social experience into a
“universal” language of Science. Census data is used in Malian government publications
(Institut National de la Statistique 2009), USAID projects and proposals (USAID 2009b),
and academic research (Gage 2007). In addition, fertility and examples of the
consequences of unregulated fertility are expressed through quantifiable variables. This
data is important for understanding grander trends and I by no means wish to discredit the
usefulness of this type of research. However, the tendency to hold quantitative data as the
means of validation excludes important phenomena and can obscure social reality. This is
most often the case when there is an attempt to quantify qualitative experience. USAID’s
RAPID Model is one such example of a deployed mechanism which quantifies social
reality (USAID 2009e). It is a computer model which manipulates a series of data to
provide possible outcomes based on political, economic, and social factors. This
quantifiable preference is not unique to development initiatives; it is also employed (often
usefully) by researchers to understand larger trends in the family planning space. For
example, researchers attempting to understand and rate family planning program effort
begin by assigning quantitative values to a series of observations (Entwisle 1989).
Numbers and Science are being placed above the social reality of a population
which is, admittedly, much more difficult to understand than a computer-generated
number. There arises a question in such circumstances of how to ensure that figures are
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truly representative of the lived realities of the target population and not the assumed
realities.
This language of science serves another purpose in addition to separating social
and biological realities. It also is the language of the tool which is intended to control
fertility. Family planning initiatives operate under the assumption that Malian women
will define themselves as modern women. With a reliance on science, fertility is
controlled through modern contraception. USAID supplies the majority of these products,
primarily condoms and oral contraceptive pills (Brand 2001). As a major promoter of
these products, they are often sold far below the standard market price of competitors
(ibid.). Scientific methods are the legitimate mechanisms to control fertility whereas
previously utilized methods (some of which were useful and some of which were not)
become incorrect. Modern Malian women are supposed to value scientific discourse and
understand its insights as truth.

Case Study: Project Keneya Ciwara
In this section I would like to provide a brief illustration of how the knowledge of
family planning development is employed in Mali. We can see that explicit and implicit
ideas of modernity and global economics shape outreach projects throughout the state. I
will take as my case study USAID’s Keneya Ciwara, specifically the program’s outreach
services in the commune of Kendie.
Kendie commune is located in the heart of Dogon country. Just south of the Niger
River, the commune is comprised of roughly 20,000 people in 30 villages. There is one
community health center run by one nurse and two midwives. There are no doctors in the
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commune. The closest center for serious medical problems is in Bandiagara, a 45
kilometer trek for most people. (CARE 2009)
USAID’s High Impact Health Services (HIHS) program is designed to decrease
maternal and child mortality. Deployed throughout Mali, HIHS focuses on 6 technical
areas in order to improve the health of the target population. Family
planning/reproductive health is only one of these foci. USAID partners with CARE,
Group Pivot Santé Population, IntraHealth, and the Center for Communication Programs
of the John Hopkins University, as well as local Malian NGO’s to bring services and
education to the population. Project Keneya Ciwara II, currently on its second phase of
implementation, is tasked with increasing availability and demand of health services by
enhancing community outreach. Though only one of USAID’s family planning outreach
projects, Keneya Ciwara is among the largest. Currently operating in 13 districts and the
capital city of Bamako, Keneya Ciwara reaches 30% of the total population (CARE 2009,
USAID 2009b).
Project Keneya Ciwara directs education and service dissemination through
community outreach workers. With roughly 4000 outreach workers in Mali, there are
currently 18 operating in Kendie. Supervised by the local NGO AMPRODE/SAHEL,
each outreach worker is responsible for networking with an estimated 35 households.
Keneya Ciwara primarily functions in a door-to-door sales/education capacity. Outreach
workers buy contraceptive supplies (at very low cost) which they sell to their neighbors
for a small profit. The profit is intended to be reinvested in a Ka Jigiya Ton (women’s
microfinance/credit group, literally “Women’s Savings Club”), the proceeds from which
will be used to buy more family planning supplies for further resale. (CARE 2009)
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Each community worker receives only 7 days of health education training before
disseminating family planning information and products. The implicit idea behind
community outreach is diffusion. As members of the community become outreach
workers, they spread family planning knowledge to their neighbors through education
seminars and through community affiliations. Theoretically, family planning values will
spread throughout the community more quickly if facilitated by several local liaisons than
by health professionals alone. This idea is accentuated in areas, like Kendie, where
healthcare workers are scarce.
Family planning is intentionally spread through concepts of economic
transformation to achieve a more modern, healthy community. Keneya Ciwara relies
primarily on women’s community and professional networks to spread family planning
information and goods. Women’s formal employment settings, like schools, hair salons,
and manufacturing facilities (karite butter) are key targets for family planning messaging.
Microfinance networks and services are integrated into all aspects of the program. This is
an explicit link between women’s decreased domestic responsibilities with increased
economic activities.
However, in order to achieve this economic transition, Keneya Ciwara must
change local ideas about the relationship between children and economics. In the rural
Dogon country, where the harsh terrain dictates all aspects of life, there are two primary
methods of subsistence: millet farming and migration to other places for work. As with
other agricultural societies beset by high infant/child mortality rates, the Dogon
emphasize large families. One the one hand, large families provide workers for family
crops. Children can also send remittances home when working in neighboring cities and
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countries. On the other hand, because death rates are so high, families must have many
children in order to have enough workers. Though this reality is acknowledged by
Keneya Ciwara, it is not necessarily addressed. It is assumed that local rationales for
large families will be readily overwritten in light of family planning’s logical, sciencebased message.
Moussa Tembiné, the husband of a Keneya Ciwara outreach worker in Kendie,
explains the primary challenge to spreading family planning knowledge in the region.
Men, as yet, don’t understand family planning…It is not going to make
their women promiscuous. Rather, it will stop them getting old before
their time. A woman who uses family planning can work better and
contribute more to the family. This, in turn, helps men, but men don’t
understand this yet. (CARE 2009)
Within Moussa’s observation is the key economic rationale for family planning deployed
by Keneya Ciwara: women can be economic producers. The cultural reality that children
are economic contributors is not necessarily challenged. Instead, the woman is replacing
the contribution of children in an economic capacity. The health of women is also
emphasized, though it is secondary throughout Keneya Ciwara documents. Women are
encouraged to become more immersed in economic activities. Outreach workers sell
family planning products and network with microfinance groups.
The success of Keneya Ciwara is questionable. As discussed, the project is overtly
imbedded in western concepts of modernity, progress and prosperity. Formal, regulated
economic participation is the goal of the project and also the means by which fertility is
to be curbed. Currently on its second phase, Keneya Ciwara was successful in that it
received increased funding and the project was renewed in 2008 (CARE 2009). USAID
currently funds $16.5 million of the project (USAID 2009b). CARE (2009) reports that

56

knowledge of modern contraceptive methods increased from 76% in 2004 to 85% in
2008. Contraceptive use rates for women vary. Of those women involved in microfinance
groups, 13.5% reported using modern contraceptive methods (ibid.). This is juxtaposed
with a use rate of 6% (aligned with the national average) of women not involved in
microfinance groups (ibid.). Interestingly, CARE does not report the contraceptive use
rates for these groups before Keneya Ciwara projects were initially implemented in 2004.
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CH. 6 DUELING DISCOURSES: FOREIGN AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGES
Having examined both local realities of Malian women’s reproductive experience
and the prevailing tenants of family planning discourse let us now turn to the West
African context where that discourse is employed. I would like to once again highlight
some of the most contentious aspects of family planning knowledge employed in Mali.
This comparison is one way to broadly examine the fitness of an initiative on a large
ideological scale. Rather than examine specific instances of program and population
incompatibility, a task which I leave for later work, I would like to discuss general
contentions to the knowledge of family planning and attempted formation of the ideal
woman. This comparison, admittedly high-level, is intended to be an example of how
imposed family planning discourse is incongruent with local realities and thus offer an
explanation for its continuing lackluster progress.

Development, Evolution, and Economics
I will refrain from too lengthy a discussion on the dangers of modernization
theory and its assumptions embodied in development discourse. Such western-centric
views are well understood and explained (Ferguson 2006, Appadurai, 1996, Gilman,
2003). However, I would like to revisit the relationships between economy, fertility, and
modernity. Family planning development assumes that there is an inverse relationship
between fertility and modernity. This is measured primarily by the economy. These
relationships harbor several assumptions that are contrary to the Malian context. The link
between fertility and economics assumes that fewer children will decrease the economic
strain on the state and free women’s time for more market-oriented activities. This
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perspective assumes three things: 1) that women who have many children do not already
participate in the market; 2) that women want to or can participate in the formal market;
and 3) that children are economic encumbrances.
As explained by Mikell (1997), the economic contributions of African women
have historically been balanced with the number of children born. The temporal division
of the sexes into a public (male) and private (female) sphere is inadequate to understand
how gender, status, and economy interrelate. “The economic contributions of women are
traceable beyond the household…With the growing scale of society and increased
production of different economic items, many African women have had opportunities to
benefit themselves and their corporate groups by playing major roles in the exchange
network, particularly in the agriculturally dynamic areas of West Africa” (ibid. p. 10).
Women have consistently participated in commerce, if not by choice then by necessity.
Holloway (2007) describes the economic duties of mothers to their families, which
requires market participation and/or agricultural work in “women’s fields.” In Bamako,
Brand (2001) notes that during her extended study “the notion of ‘working women’ did
not prove very useful…It turned out that there was scarcely a woman to be found who did
not have some kind of income of her own…The majority of women’s work is
characterized by an extreme flexibility and diversification of income sources, to cope
with various sorts of economic and financial insecurity” (p. 4).
Many arguments for women’s incorporation into the formal economy are voiced
from western feminist backgrounds (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003). In general,
creating a direct correlation between fertility and economics should be approached
warily. Critics from the Marxist feminist camp argue that women are relegated to a
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domestic sphere because of capitalist production. Fernandez Kelly (1989) claims that
“gender [is] a contradictory process that allows for the maintenance of a substratum of
labor, predominantly female, outside market exchanges” (p. 613). Women are workers
but function more as behind-the-scenes workers, supporting husbands and bearing
children. The children could be thought of as the chains of patriarchy, tying women to the
home. This reality, such researchers claim, is executed through patriarchal dominance
(ibid.). It also bolsters patriarchy, giving men further control over women’s access to
markets. However, these claims emphasize that it is not men who necessitate this
relationship, it is capitalism itself. These ideas are very often promulgated in literature
emphasizing women’s rights, independence, and autonomy. Western feminism is very
closely associated with such rhetoric.
This idea of patriarchal dominance often extends into arguments of reproductive
health and power dynamics. Many feminist scholars, such as Blanc (2001), build upon
Marxist arguments of patriarchal control of production and extend theories to include
control over sexual reproduction. Blanc claims that gendered power in sexual
relationships impacts reproductive health because men control both the physical and
financial lives of women. Such studies assume that male control, usually bolstered by
capitalism, is consistent. They also tend to attribute male-female social relationships the
greatest weight of all social relationships in reproductive decision-making. More recently
African feminists have contributed meaningfully to the dialogue on African women’s
“subordination,” refuting many of the assumptions harbored by their western
counterparts. Sudarkasa (2005) argues against Marxist feminist ideas that modes of
production and confinement to a theoretical domestic sphere are the defining attributes of
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women’s subordination. Instead, she and others (Mikell 1997, Nnaemeka 2005) highlight
a “natural complementarity” between the genders. She argues that male-female
relationships are plural and context specific, as opposed to being characterized by one
larger sex-based status. However, the idea of multiple statuses is also potentially
problematic because it may gloss over greater trends of subordinate-dominant
relationships.
This idea is reflected in the work of Brand (2001) who challenges the malefemale dichotomy in which many western feminists operate. She contends that other
social actors influence intersex relationships. She argues that male-female dichotomies
simplify women’s interactions in the social world, essentialize male-female relationships,
and ignore power differences beyond gender. I find this distinction helpful as issues of
power, economy, and fertility are explored. It is clear that Malian women have
historically, and continue to be, very involved in their own economic wellbeing;
however, the character of that participation is ambiguous. Attempts to correlate women’s
formal market participation with the number of dependents remain dangerous.
The cost/worth of children is one of the more prominent contentions between
family planning knowledge and local knowledge. To further explain this, I turn to
Dettwyler (1994) who sums up this conflict with a simple analogy.
If you are the only one with money, and can only afford a small pizza, but
you have lots of friends, then each person gets only a little piece. The
more friends, the less each one gets. However, if your friends contribute
money to the pizza fund, then you can afford to buy a bigger pizza,
especially if some of those friends contribute more than the value of the
pizza they eat…It is a common misperception in the West that
overpopulation accounts for most of the poverty and malnutrition in Third
World countries. This notion, that simply limiting population growth
through birth control methods, would alleviate poverty and malnutrition,
comes from two assumptions abased on Western economic systems that
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simply don’t apply to much of rural Africa. First, in the West, wealth tends
to flow down the generations: parents sow and children reap…In West
Africa, however,…wealth flows up the generations. Adults and children
are breadwinners, and children become net income producers at a very
young age. (ibid. p. 77)
Children’s economic contributions are in wage work and agricultural labor (Mikell,
1997). They also are a source of social capital by maintaining communal ties and
relationship networks by trading skills, labor, or spouses. Brand (2001) observes that the
price/worth of children can be summed by four functions: as vessels of immortality by
passing on heritage; as retirement insurance as they take care of elderly parents; as
defining traits of womanhood; and as embodiments of emotional or intrinsic value (p.
233). In addition, children can function as bartering mechanisms and status symbols. This
is particularly important for women in polygamous unions competing for status and
favors (Brand 2001).
This fundamental contradiction in the worth of children presents a formidable
challenge to family planning initiatives. Within it is a challenge to what makes Malian
women, women. The pro-natalist sentiments of the Malian community go beyond access
to modern contraceptive techniques and are ingrained in the social and economic fabric
of daily life. Unless this reality can be understood and reflected by family planning
programs, and unless they are structured in a way to provide necessary healthcare access
without attempting to dismantle the ways in which women think about themselves, their
families, and their realities, then the struggles and lackluster progress of family planning
programs are likely to continue.
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Knowledge and Power
Family planning initiatives operate within the discourse of Science. With that new
knowledge, a new lexicon is introduced and new methods/objects of validation are
assigned. With this knowledge, family planning programs also reinforce new constructs
of power. This power is regulated by gatekeepers of knowledge. These individuals are
those who are sanctioned by an existing knowledge structure or an imposed knowledge
structure to pass judgment on and treat Malian women. In this section I would like to
highlight the asymmetry between family planning power/knowledge structures and those
that are preexisting. It is this new validation mechanism, vocabulary, and power structure
that are the immediate hurdles with which the target population must contend in order to
utilize the provided services.
The discourse of Science in family planning medicalizes social behavior and
women. The medicalization of femininity challenges prevailing knowledge of what
constitutes Malian womanhood. Science becomes the logic by which women are partially
described. It is this scientific understanding of the self which family planning hopes to
impress upon Malian women through the disciplinary process. For family planning, the
hallmarks of femininity and the social construction thereof, are secondary to a biological
and economic determinism.
When thinking about African communities outside the direct course of Science,
there is a danger of romanticizing their natural knowledge. I wish to avoid this
misconception. Malian women are not necessarily natural beings (or not any more natural
than their western counterparts); instead, they are beholden to a different system of health
belief models. As detailed by Madhavan and Diarr (2001), menstrual irregularities (a
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perceived disease of fertility) are associated with witchcraft and linked directly with
healthy childbearing. Pregnant women may refrain from walking about at night for fear
of being possessed or cursed by jealous spirits or competing women (Dettwyler 1994,
Brand 2001). Pregnancy is often hidden from those around in order to protect the woman
and child from supernatural powers (Brand 2001). These mystical rationales assign a
concrete culprit to maladies and also prescribe actions, if any, that women can take to
remedy the situation. Thus, the conceptualization of healthcare and disease is not
fatalistic but actively engages the subject and the community, assigning an agency and
power. Ultimately, however, that agency is only assigned to a degree before it becomes
the “will of Allah.” Though the cause of disease is tangible, the actual loss itself is due to
god.
Science itself contradicts these basic ideas and practices of health and disease.
While it does not challenge mysticism wholly, it does attribute abstract notions to health.
The biological assignment of fault removes the power of agency from the subject and
also removes the contextual understanding of why the malady occurred in the first place.
There is no longer any concrete rationale for health or actions related to treatment.
With the conscription of the professional is created a power dynamic. Since the
professional has the authority to define the object and possess certain knowledge, they are
privileged in the institution. As ideas of truth and validation are constructed in the family
planning program, so too are notions of power and knowledge. Who owns that
knowledge and how it is organized become structured according the development
initiative.
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Specific members of the community have historically held positions of power
based on knowledge; they are the gatekeepers of knowledge in a sense in that they
preserve knowledge and skills but also have the power to distribute that knowledge as
they see fit. This same structure exists with circumcision rights, wherein specific older
women of the community have the knowledge of the ceremony and symbolism and the
license to carry it out (Holloway 2007, Boddy 1989). As Brand (2001) relates,
“knowledge is used to mark the social structure in society” (p. 172-3). She observed the
repercussions of proprietary knowledge in family planning clinics in Bamako; rather than
disclosing all reproductive information to patients, Brand observed that healthcare
workers would retain that knowledge and simply direct patients to follow directions
(ibid.). Among the Fulani and Humbebe of rural Mali, Castle (1994) explains that the
“diagnoses of foondu and heendu15…sustain hierarchical pathways of information
transmission [within] the community, reinforce the mysticism and autonomy of
traditional healers, and restrict any questioning of their competence or of the efficacy of
their cures…[they] also reinforce power relations both between the group members and
between healers and their clientele” (p. 331).
Family planning structures do not recognize the local knowledge gatekeeper. The
post is instead assigned to a medical professional. This professional is often removed
from the community and operates by a distinct set of knowledges. Women in the target
population are thus surrounded by a discourse which must be navigated in order to utilize
any desired services. However, those discourses are contrary to existing structures and
are likely not to be readily interpreted.

15

Foondu (bird) and heendu (wind) are local diagnoses for child illness and death. For further information
see the section “Making Malian Women.”
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Repercussions of Incompatibility
Family planning discourse attempts to transform and discipline Malian women.
What happens when this transformation is met with resistance? As discussed, the
knowledge employed by family planning does not coincide with the way Malian women
see the world. It is thus not difficult to see why initiatives are not achieving their intended
results. However, the consequences of this incompatibility are not well understood. What
are the consequences of this clash of discourses? This discussion is intended to only
highlight potential avenues of future research which will be needed to study the actual
effects of imposed discourse.
At the institutional level we can see that family planning is failing. As a
consequence of imposed foreign structures Malian women are not seeking or receiving
services that they want or that are appropriate for their health. They either cannot
navigate the imposed structures or do not wish to do so as the ideology promoted is
drastically divergent from theirs. The institutional consequences are ineffective
initiatives. Maternal and infant/child mortality rates are relatively constant. Fertility is
still on an “unregulated” path as the population continues to grow. Economically, these
institutional failures are fiscally wasteful, contradicting the proposed benefits of family
planning’s cost effectiveness. The capital spent on initiating these programs and
garnering political support is substantial and thus the fallout particularly detrimental as
objective outcomes continue to be elusive.
At the community level, a side effect of this incompatibility is the incomplete
adoption of technology, knowledge, and services by the target population. While I find
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this avenue of research the most interesting it is also the least studied. I cite Bledsoe
(2002) in this regard who states that “although increasing proportions of the world’s
women are turning to these contraceptives, little anthropological attention has been
devoted to how people may be configuring them to their reproductive and social lives”
(p. 5). She addresses this issue in her book “Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging
in West Africa” where she explores disparate views of fertility and they ways in which
services and knowledge are restructured according to local understandings. One such
restructuring I find relevant and interesting is that women in The Gambia have adopted
long term contraceptive techniques (depo provera) in order to preserve fertility, not
diminish it. This observation resonates with this study’s findings that imposed ideologies
are ignorant (or at least careless) or local structures.
In her detailed study of the diagnosis of heendu and foondu among the Fulani and
Humbebe, Castle (1994) describes the way allopathic medicine has been absorbed into
existing rationales for childhood illness and disease. Rather than overriding local
justifications for child death with scientific fact, the communities in Castle’s study
revised their justifications to account for western medicine’s existence.
Once a diagnosis of foondu has been made, local opinion indicates that
there is little hope for the child, and general consensus is that modern
medicines are powerless against the illness. Thus, going to the hospital or
doctor with a child who has diarrhea and a fever but who has been
diagnosed as having foondu is considered ineffectual and inappropriate.
By contrast, a child who has a simple diarrhea and fever (without clenched
fists) rather than one related to foondu can, according to popular belief,
respond to biomedical therapies. (ibid. p. 320)
What are the effects of incomplete knowledge adoption? What happens when
resources are made available but ideologies and knowledge of those resources are not
incorporated into the society? How does the discourse of the target population
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incorporate the imposed discourse? These are interesting questions that could potentially
inform future development initiatives. Though clearly beyond the scope of my current
analysis they will hopefully be addressed in today’s growing body of literature.
While it is evident that Mali’s centralized family planning initiative is failing to
procure its stated outcomes, it remains to be seen why the family planning system itself
flourishes, continuing to receive increased budgets (Brand 2001, Embassy of the United
States 2009). If intended outcomes are elusive, what are the actual effects of family
planning development in Mali? Ginsburg and Rapp (1991), in their article “The Politics
of Reproduction,” relate the transformations within the anthropological world that have
led to an increase in studies linking reproduction to control. It is not the control of the
individual here that is in question, but the control over an economic and political
potential. As Ferguson (1994) explains, the expansion of political influence is a side
effect of development. This is certainly an affect of family planning which lends validity
to biopolitical interpretations of the programs and agencies that support them. The stateoriented rhetoric that accompanies this spread of political power continues to assign a
new identity to Malian women, seeking to revise identifiers, changing definitions of tribe
and kin to that of Malian citizens. In addition, there is a global component to this
consolidation process. The forces of globalization and westernization are employed
through family planning initiatives and likely spread the effects of these phenomena. We
thus have not only a state-orientation but a grander geo-political and economic
identification of the Malian self.
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CH. 7 CONCLUSIONS
In truth, this analysis was born out of a perceived insufficiency of current analyses
of Malian family planning to fully explain not only seeming failures of centralized
projects, but to also fully relate the centralized structure with those effects. Much of the
research, while providing imperative insight into the population’s reaction to family
planning innovations, tends to lack the reflexivity and re-evaluative qualities to truly
question the premises of family planning in Mali and understand the inherent tendencies,
contradictions, and simplifications which impact “successful” initiative construction. In
studying the existing body of knowledge I failed to locate high level analyses of why
family planning in Mali is failing beyond specific implementation projects. Moreover, a
general explanation of how centralized family planning is affecting the local population,
how its structures are being imposed, reformulated, and navigated is elusive.
My analysis of initiative fitness (comparisons of knowledge) is not intended to
replace existing, continuing, and future studies of family planning program evaluation
and outcome. They are imperative to developing a complete understanding of family
planning initiatives. However, analyses such as this are intended to supplement those
studies and offer a qualitative assessment of initiative structures and population impact,
providing a broad reminder of the discursive formations to which we are all bound. I have
sought to explore family planning initiatives in three ways: by understanding how the
family planning initiative functions discursively, by understanding how those discursive
formations are incompatible with local realities, and by briefly exploring some of the
possible consequences of uncooperative discourses.
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The research exposes concerns about the nature of family planning initiatives as
they are currently conceptualized by a centralized state and globalizing powers. As this
analysis places family planning within the development apparatus, it assigns a depth to
initiatives beyond the local actors to include states and international agencies. Malian
family planning becomes three-dimensional as its program attributes are extended to
overarching discourses on the nature and purpose of development. This also locates
Malian family planning within a history that is both foreign, of western heritage and
engineering, but also local. Malian leaders are complicit in the existing structure, blurring
what is forced and what is reinforced. Examining the discursive structures which
formulate knowledges and objects illustrates just how immediate the effects of far-off
spaces and times are. This study aims to capture some of the dynamism of the family
planning environment, illustrating the constant shifts in landscape, attitudes, and
behavior.
What does this discussion of opposing discursive structures mean outside of the
theoretical? How do discursive formations help explain the nature of family planning
initiatives and the manners in which they impact the target population? This analysis is
intended to generate more questions about family planning rather than arrive at definitive
conclusions. In examining the discursive formations of an imposed initiative, it is my
hope that the importance of contextual relativity be revisited in light of family planning’s
globalizing forces. Though this analysis focused on the larger discursive structures at
work, the applicability of initiative fitness studies in future research truly lays at the local
level. An institutional ethnography of a localized family planning program and
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supplementary ethnographic analysis of the immediate population can reveal important
information about how family planning knowledge is impacting the local population.
I have argued that family planning is failing because foreign knowledge clashes
with existing knowledge. This is preventing the Malian woman from completely
understanding herself and her environment according to family planning views. In light
of this analysis I am skeptical if large centralized family planning initiatives can be
structured in such a way as to mitigate their tendencies to simplify and erase local
knowledge as means to enact change. Does family planning, as it is currently conceived,
make sense in the West African context? Would the ultimate aims of family planning
(decreased fertility, economic development, and fewer maternal and infant deaths) be
better served by improvements to other arenas of daily life? Carefully, I would like to say
that appropriate family planning structures are possible, however, significant alterations
to initiative ideology would be necessary and a local rather than global interest would
need to be cultivated.
Ultimately, the ramifications of this study are highly concentrated in the
revisionist spirit. It is with a more complete understanding of both women’s realities and
the realities of the family planning industry that more specific indications of family
planning initiatives’ failing aspects may be identified, revised, and improved. It is with
the goal of improving women’s access to healthcare (whether by the name of family
planning or something else) that this analysis is being undertaken. As this study has
hopefully relayed, these initiative changes can be truly useful if a revisionist approach is
taken to family planning initiative construction and the program and population are
viewed as coexisting in a reciprocal relationship.
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